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LEGISLATION
THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN LABOR ACT
Introduction
Acclaimed by many as labor's Magna Carta,' the National Labor
Relations Act,2 more familiarly known as the Wagner Act, was en-
acted in 1935. Decidedly pro-labor, the act ignored the area of im-
proper union activity while concentrating primarily on the question
of improper employer conduct.3 Under the beneficent rays of such
favorable legislation, the American labor movement experienced an
extensive, if not unprecedented, expansion.4 Unhappily, with this
tremendous increase in size and strength came, not unnaturally, how-
ever much deplored, the concomitant abuses. A scant twelve years
after the passage of the Wagner Act, Congress felt constrained to
enact the Labor Management Relations Act 5 (Taft-Hartley Act) to
remedy certain evils resulting from the practices of some unions and
their officers.6 Foremost among the factors paving the way for the
enactment of such restrictive measures was, undoubtedly, the rash
of postwar strikes which plagued the nation in 1946. 7 The chaos,
created by the sudden disruption of the cooperative atmosphere which
had prevailed in the labor-management field during the war years,8
focused public attention upon the subject of labor relations, and
"engendered the violent reaction . . . which led to the Taft-Hartley
Act." '
1 McGranery, A Jurist's View of Proposed Changes it the Present
National Labor Relations Act, 32 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 8 (1957).
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
3 Glushien, Federal Pre-emption In Labor Relations, 15 FED. B.J. 4, 5
(1955).
4 "The organized labor movement as a whole was between 126 and 140
per cent larger in 1939 than in 1929 .... " DERBER & YOUNG, LABOR AND THE
NEW DEAL 16, 17 (1957).
561 Stat. 136 (1947).
6 Note, A Comparative Survey of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley
Bill, 2 Sw. L.J. 6 (1948).
7 Meany, Labor's View of Proposed Changes in the Present National Labor
Relations Act, 32 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 14, 16 (1957).
8 "[D]uring World War II most unions conscientiously and scrupu-
lously observed the no-strike pledge which they voluntarily gave the govern-
ment." Id. at 15.
9 Meany, op. cit. supra note 7, at 15.
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Received with not unmixed emotions, the Taft-Hartley Act,
with its objective of prescribing "the legitimate rights of both em-
ployees and employers in their relations affecting commerce," 10 was
cheered by management as preserving "labor's right to organize and
bargain collectively [but also providing] . . . a needed framework
of 'ground rules' which would enable management to bargain with
unions on an equal footing," "1 while jeered by labor as a "Slave
Labor Act" designed to emasculate the American labor movement.'
2
However, neither the optimism of management' 3 nor the pessimism
of labor 14 were justified. Nowhere is this more clearly illustrated
than in the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Ac-
tivities in the Labor-Management Field 15 (McClellan Committee).
The investigation conducted by the McClellan Committee sharply
pointed up the necessity for remedial labor legislation, particularly
in the areas of federal-state jurisdiction,' 6 hot cargo agreements 17
and blackmail picketing.' 8
Federal-State Jurisdiction
According to the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board extended
to all labor disputes affecting interstate commerce.1 9 During its
formative period the Board was primarily concerned with determin-
ing the actual scope of its jurisdiction to remedy unfair labor prac-
tices.2 0 On April 12, 1937, the Supreme Court, in reviewing the first
five cases 21 arising under the act, fully established the absolute.
unqualified scope of the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor prac-
1061 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1958).
1 Abelow, Management Experience Under the Taft Hartley Act, 11 IxD.
& LAB. REL. REv. 360 (1958).
12 Ibid.
'3 Ibid.
14 Despite the "Slave Labor Act," union membership has increased by more
than 3,500,000 since its enactment. Ibid.
1585th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
26 See Pam~o, PowER UNLIMITED-THE ComuPToN oF UNION LEADERSHIp
248-50 (1959).
17 Id. at 225-26.
i8 Id. at 222-24.
2961 Stat 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958). "Affecting commerce"
is defined as meaning: "in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce
or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dis-
pute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce .
61 Stat. 138 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1958).2 0 Humphrey, The Changing Jurisdictional Standards of the National Labor
Relations Boards: Have They Created a Penumbral Area Between Federal and
State Jurisdiction?, 15 FED. B.J. 30, 31 (1955).
21 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
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tices affecting commerce.2 2  However, the Supreme Court cautioned
that the jurisdiction of the Board should be exercised sparingly in
order to avoid encroaching upon local commerce. In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,23 Chief Justice Hughes warned:
[T] he scope of this power must be considered in the light of our dual system
of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon inter-
state commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely centralized government.
. . . The question is necessarily one of degree. 24
In 1937, as the result of a letter dated July 12 from the Chair-
man of the New York State Labor Relations Board to the National
Labor Relations Board, an understanding was reached as to the
practical allocation of cases between them.2 5 According to the agree-
ment, the National Board was to exercise jurisdiction over the inter-
state industries, while the State Board would handle predominantly
local and borderline situations.26  Similar arrangements were entered
into between the National Board and other state agencies. 27
Thus, the Board first declined jurisdiction where the industries
were substantially local in character. By 1946 the Board was also
declining jurisdiction over enterprises which, although theoretically
within its purview, did not affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
warrant the exercise of federal power.28  The Board also refused to
assume jurisdiction over certain local enterprises in states which had
so-called "Little Wagner Acts" but refused to refrain in states which
had no such legislation.29  In 1950 the Board further restricted the
area over which it would assert jurisdiction by announcing that it
would act only in cases where the annual interstate sales or purchases
of the enterprise involved reached certain minimum dollar values. 30
These standards were made more stringent in 1954.31
It was the impression of many federal and state courts that the
states possessed the authority to regulate labor relations in areas
where either the Board had declined jurisdiction or the employer's
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) ; Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103(1937); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
22 Humphrey, op. cit. supra note 20, at 31-32.
23301 U.S. 1 (1937).
24 Id. at 37.
25 See Appendix to Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations
Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 794-96 (1947).
26 Di Fede, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor-Management
Disputes, 4 N.Y.L.F. 398, 399 (1958).
27 Ibid.
28 Jenkins, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 31
RocKY MT. L. Rav. 315, 317 (1959).
29 Ibid.
30 Syrnposium-NLRB Jurisdictional Standards and State Jurisdiction, 50
Nw. U.L. Ry. 190, 191 (1955).
31 Id. at 192.
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operations did not meet the Board's jurisdictional standards.3 2  How-
ever, in 1947 and 1949 the Supreme Court, in two cases 33 involving
representation proceedings by state boards, struck down the theory
of concurrent jurisdiction, basing its decision on the potentiality of
conflicts.
34
Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act was a step forward in
the possible clarification of this problem. It granted the NLRB
authority to cede jurisdiction to state agencies "unless the provision
of the State or Territorial statute applicable ... is inconsistent with
the corresponding provisions of [the] . . . Act or has received a
construction inconsistent therewith." 35 Unfortunately, however, no
cession agreement was ever made with a state agency since no state
law was found to have the requisite consistency with the federal act.
36
In 1950 this pre-emption doctrine was extended to cases in-
volving unfair labor practice proceedings.3 7  Three years later in
Garner v. Teamsters Union 38 the Court further extended the doctrine
to injunctions against picketing by unions.39 It was not until 1957,
however, that the full impact of the pre-emption doctrine became
apparent. On March 25 of that year the Supreme Court combined
three decisions, and developed a doctrine in the case of Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Bd.40 Each of these cases posed the question of
whether or not a state possesses the authority to exercise jurisdic-
tion over labor disputes where the National Board had declined
jurisdiction because of the predominantly local nature of the con-
troversy. In each instance the Court replied in the negative, holding
32 Jenkins, op. cit. supra note 28, at 316.
33 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947); La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 18 (1949).
34 Ibid. See generally Di Fede, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in
Labor-Management Disputes, 4 N.Y.L.F. 398 (1958).
3561 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
36 Cosgrove, Pending: A National Labor Policy, 34 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 165,
167 (1959).
37 Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338
U.S. 953 (1950) (mem. opinion). The Court again reaffirmed its rulings in
the Bethlehem and La Crosse cases that where the employer's operations affect
interstate commerce, the NLRB would assert jurisdiction; the states are not
permitted to process such matters.
38 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
39 Ibid. The Court stated that "the reasons for excluding state ad-
ministrative bodies from assuming control of matters expressly placed within
the competence of the federal Board also excludes state courts from like
action." Id. at 491.
40353 U.S. 1 (1957). This case concerned an employer's refusal to bar-
gain collectively with a union which represented a majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit; Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union v. Fairlawn Meats,
Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957), and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
353 U.S. 26 (1957), were appeals from state court injunctions-in Fairlawt,
against picketing by non-representative unions for recognition and, in Garmon,
a contract including a union security clause.
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that the state boards and courts were without jurisdiction even if
the National Board would not act.
By virtue of the NLRB minimal monetary standards as set
forth in 1950 and 1954,'41 and the Guss doctrine as expounded by
the Supreme Court, a large number of smaller enterprises have been
effectively excluded from the coverage of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
parties so excluded from federal coverage could not bring their dis-
putes to state agencies or state courts. Thus, they were said to be
in "no-man's land."
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 42
(Landrum-Griffin Act) attempts to remedy this situation and to pro-
vide a forum for all labor disputes, regardless of the size of the
enterprise involved. Subsection (c) has been added to Section 14 of
the National Labor Relations Act to eliminate the possibility of a
case falling into "no-man's land." 48 The amendment grants the
NLRB discretion to decline jurisdiction over any labor dispute in-
volving any class or category of employers where the effect on com-
merce is insubstantial. It permits the Board to do this pursuant to
either rule of decision or published rules. State and territorial courts,
however, are expressly given authority to exercise jurisdiction over
disputes which the Board declines under such decisional or published
rules.44
Hot Cargo Agreements
Before passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, unions engaged in
"secondary boycotts" as a means of exerting economic pressure. The
"secondary boycott" may be described as follows: union A has a
labor dispute in plant A. The employer in plant A would be known
as the primary employer. In order to exert pressure on the primary
employer, union A pickets plant B which may either supply A's raw
materials or handle his finished product but is otherwise a complete
neutral in the dispute between union A and employer A. The em-
ployer in plant B is known as the secondary employer. By the
picketing, union A hopes to induce the employees of the secondary
employer to strike or refuse to handle the goods of the primary
employer, A. Essentially it is a boycott, but of a secondary rather
than a primary nature.45
41 See Symtposiun--NLRB Jurisdictional Standards and State Jurisdiction,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. 190 (1955), for a competent coverage and analysis of thejurisdictional standards as set forth by the NLRB.
4273 Stat. 519 (14 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2953 (1959)).
43 14 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NE-ws 2983 (1959).
44 Ibid.
45 Scolnik, Hot Cargo Clauses, 9 LAB. L.J. 71, 72 (1958).
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Section 8(b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act 46 specifically pro-
scribed such activity by declaring it an unfair labor practice to:
engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage
in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services. . .. 47
on products of any employer with whom the union is involved in a
labor dispute. It will be noted that in order to fall within the pro-
hibition of the Taft-Hartley Act two essential elements were required:
1) An unlawful object such as the forcing of an employer to
cease doing business with any person.
2) An inducement or encouragement of the employees in the
course of their employment.48
In order to circumvent the prohibitions as laid down by the
Taft-Hartley Act, labor unions began the practice of including hot
cargo clauses in their contracts. The term hot cargo refers to a
method of economic pressure used by labor unions for many years
in support of their efforts to organize or to obtain various benefits
from employers. 49  Basically the hot cargo clause is an agreement
constituting a concession by an employer to a boycott.50 It is an
agreement in advance by the employer that his employees may refuse
to perform some or all of their work, for the purpose of aiding another
union in its dispute with another employer. For all practical pur-
poses the hot cargo clause permitted the unions to engage in the
very type of activity which section 8(b) (4) (A) was designed to
prohibit. By it, the union achieved the desired secondary boycott
but did not leave itself open to the charge of inducing the employees
to engage in a strike or concerted refusal. The pressure was exerted
on the employers themselves. The unions were then able to contend
that since the secondary employer had agreed to such boycotts, there
could be no violation of the law.
The Board was at first inclined to accept the union's contention.
In the Conway's Express 51 case the Board ruled that a hot cargo
46 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958).
47 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1958).
48 NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950)
(dictum), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951). See generally Scolnik, note
45 supra.
40 Scolnik, op. cit. supra note 45, at 71.
so Id. at 71-72.
5n 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949). Two of the secondary employers had contracts
providing in substance that the union reserved the right to refuse to handle
"unfair goods." The union notified its shop stewards, employees of the sec-
ondary employers, of the provisions of the contract, and in reliance thereon
the employees of these employers refused to handle the hot goods from the
struck employer.
1959 ]
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clause was a valid defense to a secondary boycott charge. The Board's
decision was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit.52 The court stated that:
Consent in advance to honor a hot cargo clause is not the product of the
union's "forcing or requiring any employer . . . to cease doing business with
any other person." 53
The later Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.54 case followed along the same
line of reasoning. There, the contract provided that it would not be
cause for discharge if the employees refused to handle "unfair goods."
The Board not only followed the theory of the Conway case but added
an additional element: that the refusal of the secondary employer's
employees to handle "unfair goods" did not constitute a refusal to
perform work "in the course of their employment" since the employer
had consented to this by contract. 55
In the subsequent McAllister Transfer, Inc.5 6 case, however,
where, despite the contract, the secondary employers posted a notice
to the effect that they had no dispute with any labor organization
and that their obligation as common carriers required them to handle
all freight tendered to them and directing their employees to handle
the freight, the Board found a violation of Taft-Hartley when the
employees continued to refuse to handle the goods. While the three-
member majority were in agreement as to the fact that a violation
did exist, they were divided as to their reasons for so finding. Two
members were of the opinion that such clauses were contrary to the
public policy expressed by the act and that employers could not in
advance waive by contract a violation of the public policy implicit in
the provision of section 8(b) (4) (A) .5  Chairman Farmer, on the
other hand, took the view that such clauses were not against public
policy, but found on the facts that the union had affirmatively induced
and encouraged its members to refuse to handle McAllister's freight
despite the secondary employer's instructions to the contrary. Farmer,
in substance, took the stand that the hot cargo clause was not con-
trary to public policy, was not unlawful, but could not be enforced by
a union's direct appeal to the employees. 58 Later, in the Sand Door
& Plywood Co.59 case, the Board again struck down the defense
of the hot cargo clause. However, only one member found it to be
contrary to public policy.60 Two of the members followed the view
of Chairman Farmer as set forth in the McAllister Transfer, Inc.
52 Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
53 Id. at 912.
54 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953).
55 Id. at 744.
56 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
57 Id. at 1779-82.
58 Id. at 1788 (concurring opinion).
59 113 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1955).
60 Id. at 1219 (concurring opinion).
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case.6 ' More recently, in Teamsters Union v. NLRB,6 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that if a hot
cargo clause is legal, a labor union can lawfully enforce it by appeals
to its members. In discussing the union's conduct in urging its mem-
bers not to handle the goods, the court said:
This was exactly what the carriers had agreed their employees would not be
required to do. If an employer may lawfully agree that its employees will
not be required to handle freight from a struck company, and such a situation
arises, it is hard to see how it can be said that, simply because the employees
do what they have the right to do, there was a strike or refusal to work. Nor
can it be said that there was a "forcing" or requiring of an employer to cease
doing business with another person, because the employer was only being com-
pelled to live up to its own voluntary contract entered into in advance of the
happening. 63
Thus, the advance agreement of the employer to the hot
cargo clause vitiated the prohibitions of section 8(b) (4) (A). The
Landrum-Griffin Act remedies the situation by making it an unfair
labor practice for unions and employers to enter into hot cargo agree-
ments and makes such agreements void whether executed before or
after the new legislation takes effect. It prohibits all agreements
whereby the employer "ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in
any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business
with any other person ... .,,1 64 In other words, labor unions are no
longer able to remove such activity from the unfair labor category
merely by obtaining the employer's consent in advance.
Blackmail Picketing
Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed in section 7 .... 65
Until 1957, the NLRB held that "restrain and coerce" regulated
only the methods employed in picketing.66 The objective of the picket
6
'Id. at 1215.
62247 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
63 Id. at 74.
64 14 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2985 (1959).
6561 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(1)(A) (1958). Section 7
states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ... " 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
66 See Note, 19 LA. L. REv. 709 (1959).
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must be directly related to the interests of the strikers and not di-
rected primarily at compelling other employees to forego rights pro-
tected by section 7. This was the Board's stated policy as laid down
in the National Maritime Union 67 case where the Board said:
We are mindful of the fact that the . . . strike had as its purpose the ac-
complishment of an illegal objective; but we are not prepared to say . . .
that a strike for an illegal objective necessarily "restrains" and "coerces"
employees, as those terms were intended to be applied in Section 8(b) (1) (A).68
The practical result of such a decision was to leave minority
unions free to engage in any sort of picketing as long as the methods
employed were peaceful. Whether the picketing is labeled recogni-
tion or organizational, and there is some doubt as to the validity of
any such distinction,69 the overall effect was the same. The object
is either to force the employer to coerce his employees to join the
union or else to force the employees to join in order to avoid the
economic loss they would suffer as a result of the employer's re-
verses.70 Thus, whatever the label may be, the picketing is nonethe-
less coercive.
As Professor Meltzer points out, coercive picketing has proved
a most lucrative activity for the less desirable elements of the labor
movement:
The recent disclosures by the McClellan Committee point to additional dangers.
Coercive picketing, actual or threatened, has been the weapon of the shake-
down artist, who will forego organization for the right price. Such tactics,
unfortunately but inevitably, endanger the good name and the legally recognized
privileges of decent as well as corrupt union leadership. Organization from
the top by the employer also invites the sweetheart contract by which un-
scrupulous employers and so-called union leaders sell the men out .... [T]hese
perversions of picketing and collective bargaining will be facilitated so long
8778 N.L.R.B. 971 (1947).
68 Id. at 986.
69 See Isaacson, Organizational Picketing: What is the Law--Ought the
Law to be Changed?, 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 345, 347 (1959). "Organizational
picketing is defined as picketing by a minority directed to employees in order
to persuade them to become union members or to win their adherence to the
union cause. Recognition picketing is picketing directed to an employer in
order to compel recognition of a minority union-to bring pressure on an
employer to bring pressure on the employees to join a picketing union." Ibid.
The distinction between them is not easy to draw. "Although organiza-
tional pickets presumably do not want recognition until they have organized a
majority of the employees, the differences in the kind of pressure exerted and
the ultimate objective are difficult to perceive .... [T]he distinction has arisen
largely by way of rationalization by judges of their opinions; when they wish
to enjoin picketing it is labeled 'recognition'; when they feel it should not
be enjoined it becomes 'organizational."' BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.,
THE LABOR REFORm LAW 94 (1959).
70 Meltzer, Recognition-Organizational Picketing and Right-to-Work Laws,
9 LAB. L.J. 55, 56 (1958).
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as employers are subject to the threat of organizational or recognition picketing
and the law and unions sanction its use.7
Until 1957, with rare exception, 72 the Board found that the
strikers themselves were primarily benefited as required by the rule
of National Maritime Union. The Board then reversed its stand
in Curtis Brothers, Inc.73 and held that peaceful picketing by a
minority union was unlawful when, although directed at the em-
ployer, its indirect effect was to coerce the employees. In that case,
after the union had lost a representation election, it continued
picketing which was at all times peaceful. The company filed an
unfair practice complaint with the NLRB, charging that the union
was picketing to force it to recognize the union as a bargaining agent
for its employees and thus compel the employees to join the union
or lose their jobs. The Board held that the picketing coerces the
employers to illegally grant exclusive recognition to a minority. The
Board's ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals 7 4 which held
that the prohibition was inapplicable to peaceful picketing, whether
organizational or recognition. The issue was pending before the
United States Supreme Court at the time the Landrum-Griffin Bill
was enacted.
The solution to the problem as set forth by the Landrum-Griffin
Act is to prohibit both organizational and recognition picketing:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act
any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not
appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section
9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days
from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a peti-
tion has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions
of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on
the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board
finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof .... 75
7" Id. at 58.
72 See Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc., 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950).
The union struck to force the employer to discharge employees who were not
union members, although there was no valid union security agreement between
them. The Board found the strike to be an unfair labor practice since it was
directed primarily at compelling an employee to forego rights protected under
section 7.
73 119 N.L.R.B. 232 (1957).
74 Teamsters Union, Local 639 v. NLRB, 36 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,030 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
7 14 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nws 2986 (1959).
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Conclusion
Undoubtedly, clarification of the federal-state jurisdictional prob-
lem should prove equally beneficial to both labor and management.
No longer will parties to a labor dispute find themselves in the rather
frustrating position of having no forum in which their controversy
may be aired and settled. The Landrum-Griffin Act should end once
and for all the existence of the troublesome "no-man's land." Simi-
larly, the prohibition of hot cargo contracts should prove most effec-
tive in closing all loop holes in the secondary boycott area. However,
the relief intended by the restrictions on recognition and organiza-
tional picketing may not be forthcoming. For example, there is noth-
ing to prevent one union from picketing an enterprise for a period of
29 days without filing a petition, then another union taking over for
another 29 days, and so on ad infinitum.
